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 Terrorism and National Security Intelligence Laws 
TERRORISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE LAWS: 
ASSESSING AUSTRALIAN REFORMS 
 
Gregory Rose∗ and Diana Nestorovska# 
 
The Australian legal definition of terrorism and a brief history of terrorism in Australia 
set the context for national security intelligence laws.  Recent national reforms are 
surveyed and critically examined here.  It is concluded that they do not duplicate other 
powers and are subject to respectable, although not impeccable, safeguards.  Some 
provisions need to be clarified to delimit their scope and others could be hampered in 




A wide array of law reforms to strengthen Australian counter-terrorism 
capabilities were introduced at Commonwealth level in 2002 and are being 
supplemented continuously.  These capabilities and their respective enabling 
laws can be divided into two categories: (a) those concerned with the 
proscription of terrorism, and which are located within the substantive criminal 
laws concerning law enforcement and punishment after the commission of 
terrorist crimes; and (b) national security laws, which gear a range of relevant 
public management sectors towards the prevention of terrorist crimes.  National 
security1 enabling laws can be sub-grouped into those concerning pro-active 
threat mitigation by means of intelligence networks, border controls and 
financial flow monitoring, and those that address responses after a terrorist 
incident by means of crisis management.2  
 
The security intelligence gathering aspects of the recent Australian reforms were 
politically controversial and much has been written attacking them as threats to 
                                                 
∗  Associate Professor, Director of Research, Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention, 
Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia. 
#  Researcher, Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention, Faculty of Law, University of 
Wollongong, NSW, Australia.  
1  The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (‘ASIO Act’) s 4 defines 
‘security’ as ‘(a) the protection of, and of the people of, the Commonwealth and the several 
States and Territories from: (i) espionage; (ii) sabotage; (iii) politically motivated violence; 
(iv) promotion of communal violence; (v) attacks on Australia’s defence system; or (vi) 
acts of foreign interference; whether directed from, or committed within Australia or not; 
and (b) the carrying out of Australia's responsibilities to any foreign country in relation to a 
matter mentioned in any of the subparagraphs of paragraph (a).’ The term ‘politically 
motivated violence’ has been defined to include ‘terrorism offences’ (s 4).  Thus, laws on 
intelligence networks, border and financial controls which serve, inter alia, the purpose of 
detecting and preventing any of these defined activities, and specifically, terrorism, can be 
regarded as national security laws. 
2  The framework for this analysis of national security laws is adapted from Nathan Hancock, 
‘Terrorism and Law in Australia: Legislation, Commentary and Constraints’, Department 
of the Parliamentary Library, Information and Research Services, Research Paper No 12 
2001-02, 9-22.  
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Australian civil liberties.3  Liberal democracies such as Australia eschew 
unnecessary constraints on freedom.4  However, the legal powers necessary for a 
democratic society's security intelligence agencies are a matter that can only be 
properly determined through its representative democratic processes.5  In 
Australia, Parliaments form the central machinery for those processes and 
federal parliamentary consideration of the security intelligence powers 
introduced by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Act 2003 (‘ASIO Terrorism Act’) has certainly been ‘robust’.6  Its 
deliberations were enriched by an opposition dominated Upper House.  
Extensive contributions were provided by independent specialists and from civil 
society through submissions to parliamentary committees.7 
 
The tendency of Australian jurists has been to critique the new counter-terrorism 
legislation for imposing unnecessary constraints by applying a rights-based 
approach, using international law human rights standards.  Williams, for 
example, suggests that counter-terrorism legislation ‘can be justified where it is 
proportionate to the threat faced and where any diminution of the rule of law or 
human rights principles is no more than is “strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation”.’8 
 
However, whether constraints on liberty are necessary (in the public policy 
sense of that term) is a question that can be approached using legal theoretical 
                                                 
3  See, eg, the special issues of the University of New South Wales Law Journal (2004) 27(2); 
and also articles by Michael Head, ‘Counter-Terrorism Laws: A Threat to Political 
Freedom, Civil Liberties and Constitutional Rights’ (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law 
Review 666; Michael Head, ‘Counter-Terrorism Laws Threaten Fundamental Democratic 
Rights’ (2002) 27(3) Alternative Law Journal 121; and George Williams, ‘One year on: 
Australia’s legal response to September 11’ (2002) 27(5) Alternative Law Journal 212, to 
name but a few. 
4  The classic liberal philosopher is John Stuart Mill: ‘There is a limit to the legitimate 
interference of collective opinion with individual independence: and to find that limit, and 
maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, 
as protection against political despotism.’ See: John Stuart Mill, ‘On Liberty’ in John M 
Robson (ed), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (1977) 220.  
5  The issue of whether such powers can be given is discussed in n 116 below. 
6  To use Hocking’s term in Jenny Hocking, ‘National Security and Democratic Rights: 
Australian Terror Laws’ (2004) 16(1) The Sydney Papers 92.  See also discussion in 
‘Parliamentary and Judicial Review’ below p151. 
7  See, eg, Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, Parliament of Australia, 
An Advisory Report on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (2002) and Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee, 
Parliament of Australia, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 and related matters (2002). 
8  George Williams, ‘National Security, Terrorism and Bills of Rights’ (2003) 8(2) Australian 
Journal of Human Rights 269.  This approach seems to draw inspiration from Dworkin’s 
work on the ‘best theory’ of political morality: see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously (1977).  
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frameworks9 other than a rights-based framework; and rights-based frameworks 
themselves are contestable.10  Mooted juridical approaches contribute value to 
the public policy debate but cannot predetermine its outcome.   
 
It is the not the authors' intention here to debate the meanings of liberty and 
security, to evaluate public policy choices or even to defend the national 
security intelligence reforms.  This article seeks, as far as is possible, to examine 
the reforms from less value-laden perspectives.  Thus, it studies them with a 
technical legal eye, analysing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
reforms in terms of whether they are duplicative and obscure, or utile and clear. 
 
First, the definition of terrorism that is utilised in Australian legislation is 
considered and then Australia’s experience with terrorism is summarised.  The 
substantive criminal laws have been assessed in detail elsewhere and are merely 
noted here to set the legal context.  The new national security intelligence laws 
are then examined and tested for clarity and for necessity, as defined below.  
The conclusion drawn is that the national security intelligence law reforms are 
utile but that some provisions need to be clarified to define their scope and 
improve their workability. 
 




The controversy that usually surrounds counter-terrorism laws largely concerns 
the conceptual definition of their core subject matter: terrorism.  There is as yet 
                                                 
9  For example, a utilitarian framework might be adopted.  (‘An action may be said to be 
conformable to the principle of utility … when the tendency it has to augment the 
happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it.’: Jeremy Bentham, ‘An 
introduction to the principles of morals and legislation’ in John Bowring (ed), The Works of 
Jeremy Bentham (1943) vol I, 1).  
10  Controversy as to the content of rights is familiar.  For example, Williams adds that 
constraints on liberty in counter-terrorism legislation should be temporary and limited by a 
sunset clause (Williams, above n 8).  The suggestion reflects Article 4 of the International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 1966 (‘ICCPR’), 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 
23 March 1976) and Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 
(‘ECHR’), 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953).  The conventions 
distinguish between core and non-core obligations and permit parties to derogate from their 
non-core obligations in times of public emergency.  Neither permits derogation at any time 
from certain core obligations (see ICCPR, Articles 6-8, 11, 15-16 and 18 and ECHR, 
Articles 2, 3, 4 and 7).  Yet there are also other formulations of human rights principles.  
For example, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the Constitution Act 1982, 
being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11, s 1 and the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 (NZ), s 5 do not distinguish between core and non-core rights and provide that 
rights are subject to any ‘reasonable limits’ prescribed by law.  In this way, Canadian and 
New Zealand laws can limit prescribed rights in ongoing circumstances that are not 
restricted to public emergencies.  Which is the better articulation for Australian public 
morality? 
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no general definition of terrorism agreed under the laws of the United Nations,11 
although it is apparent that one is finally emerging, as we have demonstrated 
elsewhere.12  A definition in Australian law is necessary to provide a clear 
reference for the triggering of the various law enforcement, security 
intelligence, incident prevention and emergency powers concerned.  Therefore, 
rather than the emerging international legal definition, the focus here is on the 
established Australian definition.  That definition is set out below.13
 
In Australia, the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth) 
amended the federal Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), to define a terrorist act and 
make it an offence.14  It is composed of two basic components: serious acts of 
violence and the context of political conflict.  For example, a serious violent 
crime such as kidnapping becomes a terrorist act if committed with the intent to 
exert pressure for gains in a political conflict.  In the amended Criminal Code, 
‘terrorist act’ means any action or threat of action that falls into subsection (2) 
of section 100.1, but does not fall under subsection (3).  An act falls within 
subsection (2) if the action or the threat of action would cause death or serious 
physical harm to a person or serious damage to property, endanger another 
person’s life, create a serious health or safety risk to the public or seriously 
interfere with, disrupt or destroy an electronic system.  The political context is 
set by requiring that the act also must be done with the intention of advancing a 
political, religious or ideological cause as well as with the intention of coercing 
or intimidating the Government of the Commonwealth or a State, or 
intimidating sections of the public.  Subsection (3) includes a safeguard for civil 
liberties.  It expressly excludes advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action 
from the operation of the Act, so long as such action is not intended to cause 
serious harm or death to a person, endanger another person’s life or create a 
serious health or safety risk to the public.15  
 
The substantive new criminal laws relating to terrorism were set out in 
amendments to the Criminal Code.  They include offences which relate to: acts 
preparatory to terrorism;16 murder or injury of Australians overseas;17 using 
                                                 
11  See Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The General International Law of Terrorism’ in Rosalyn Higgins 
and Maurice Flory (eds), Terrorism and International Law (1997) 14-19. 
12 See Gregory Rose and Diana Nestorovska, ‘Towards an ASEAN Counter-Terrorism 
Treaty’ (2005) 9 Singapore Yearbook of International Law 157, 158-166. 
13  The authors’ contribution to analysis of the Australian definition is forthcoming in a 
companion article: ‘Terrorism and Criminal Law - Assessing Australian Reforms’. 
14  Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 101.1.  The Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW), 
Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 2003 (NT), Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 
2000 (Qld), Emergency Management Act 2004 (SA) and Terrorism (Community 
Protection) Act 2003 (Vic) all adopt the Commonwealth definition of terrorist act. 
15  Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 101.1(3). 
16  Sections 101.2, 101.3, 101.4, 101.5 and 101.6, inserted into the Criminal Code Act 1995 
(Cth) by the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth) Schedule 1. 
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postal services to make threats, hoaxes or send dangerous articles;18 and 
misusing telecommunications systems to make threats.19  A legal mechanism 
was adopted within the Criminal Code to blacklist terrorist organisations and to 
criminalise directing, recruiting, funding, training, supporting or associating 
with terrorist organisations.20  In addition, terrorist bombing and financing 
activities were criminalised in accordance with recently ratified international 
conventions.21  Other amendments concerning participation in foreign 
incursions, in espionage;22 treason;23 and treachery24 were adopted harmonising 
definitions of those crimes with the new terrorist crimes.   
 
2.2 Security Intelligence 
 
National security law reforms complement the substantive criminal laws.  
Whereas criminal laws are typically administered by the police, prosecutors and 
courts, national security laws are administered by a more fragmented array of 
governmental agencies in fields such as intelligence gathering, border control, 
transport, industry, civil defence and foreign affairs.  National security laws 
support activities in all these fields, although those analysed here concern only 
security intelligence.  Security intelligence is taken here to mean data 
assembled, sometimes covertly, and analysed by government agencies to deliver 
information about intended terrorist acts in advance of their commission.25  In 
                                                                                                             
17  Division 104, inserted into the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) by the Criminal Code 
Amendment (Offences Against Australians) Act 2002 Schedule 1. 
18  Sections 471.10 and 471.14, inserted into Part 10.5 (Postal Offences) of the Criminal Code 
Act 1995 (Cth) by the Criminal Code Amendment (Anti-Hoax and Other Measures) Act 
2002 Schedule 1; and ss 471.11, 471.12, 471.13 and 471.15, inserted into Part 10.5 (Postal 
Offences) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) by the Criminal Code Amendment (Anti-
Hoax and Other Measures) Act 2002 Schedule 2. 
19  Sections 474.14, 474.15 and 474.16, inserted into the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) by the 
Crimes Legislation Amendment (Telecommunications Offences and Other Measures) (No 
2) Act 2004 Schedule 1. 
20  Division 102, inserted into the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) by the Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth) Schedule 1, and variously amended by the Anti-
Terrorism Act (No 2) 2004, Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorist Organisations) Act 2004, 
Anti-Terrorism Act 2003, Criminal Code Amendment (Hizballah) Act 2003 and Criminal 
Code Amendment (HAMAS and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba) Act 2003. 
21  These are the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, opened 
for signature 15 December 1997, [2002] ATS 17 (entered into force 23 May 2001) and the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, opened for 
signature 9 December 1999, [2002] ATS 23 (entered into force 1 April 2002).  The 
international obligations under these conventions were inserted into the Criminal Code Act 
1995 (Cth) by the Criminal Code Amendment (Suppression of Terrorist Bombings) Act 
2002 and the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Act 2002. 
22  Section 91.1, inserted into the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) by the Criminal Code 
Amendment (Espionage and Related Matters) Act 2002 Schedule 1. 
23  Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 80.1. 
24  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 24AA. 
25  The term ‘security’ for the purposes of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
Act 1979 (Cth) was defined above in n 1. 
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contrast, again, criminal investigations are usually conducted by police and 
related law enforcement agencies to gather information concerning terrorist acts 
after the proscribed acts have been committed or during their preparation.   
 
2.3 Analytical Method 
 
The new national security intelligence laws are critically examined here to 
evaluate whether they conform to criteria for necessity and clarity, as set out 
below.  This is undertaken as an essentially technical exercise.  It does not 
pretend to investigate the deeper policy questions concerning whether the new 
counter-terrorism measures are necessary for national security.   
 
To assess the necessity of the newly adopted provisions, this paper compares the 
new provisions to others already present within the broader framework of 
Commonwealth law.  The humble purpose of this connection is to assess 
whether the new laws are duplicative, or overlap substantially and inconsistently 
with existing laws.  To assess their clarity, analysis is undertaken of whether 
they are specific, certain, readily understood and practicable.  Where the new 
provisions are found lacking in either respect, suggestions are offered for their 
improvement. 
 
The constitutionality of the national security law amendments has a bearing 
upon whether they are certain and workable.  Their support by a constitutional 
head of power has been addressed elsewhere and is not discussed here.26  
However, whether the amendments contravene express and implied rights 
within the Constitution is explored.  Much of the controversy surrounding the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ‘ASIO Act’ might 
stem from the fact that Australia, unlike some other Western nations, does not 
have a constitutional Bill of Rights against which to judge the ASIO Act 
provisions.27  Instead, the ASIO Act has been assessed during its various stages 
against the provisions of international human rights instruments, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’).28  Nevertheless, 
                                                 
26  Carne considers the Constitutional heads of power which could support the ASIO 
amendments: Greg Carne, ‘Detaining Questions or Compromising Constitutionality? The 
ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth)’ (2004) 27(2) University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 524, 528.  From 531 he discusses the following powers: defence; 
external affairs; executive power, express incidental power; and ‘the implied power to 
protect the polity’. 
27 Williams, above n 8, 269.  See also George Williams, The Case for an Australian Bill of 
Rights: Freedom in the War on Terror 2004. 
28  For example, see Christopher Michaelsen, ‘International Human Rights on Trial – The 
United Kingdom’s and Australia’s Legal Response to 9/11’ (2003) 25 Sydney Law Review 
275.  Relevant provisions in the ICCPR include those against arbitrary arrest or detention 
(art 9), protection from self-incrimination (art 14(3)(g)), the presumption of innocence (art 
14(2)) and the treatment of detainees (arts 7 and 10).  Ultimately, if the ASIO amendments 
are inconsistent with the ICCPR, the international legal issue is whether the derogations can 
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the suggestion that the ICCPR provides guidance in Australian constitutional 
interpretation is dubious.29  More pertinent to Australian legal interpretation are 
the express and implied rights within the Australian Constitution, as recognised 
in the jurisprudence of the Australian High Court. 
 
3 TERRORISM: THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE 
 
Unlike countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia has had relatively 
limited experience with terrorism on its own soil, the Hilton bombing having the 
highest profile.  On 13 February 1978, a bomb exploded outside the Hilton 
Hotel in Sydney, where the first Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
(‘CHOGM’) was scheduled to take place later that day.  It killed three people 
and injured several others.  The Prime Minister at the time, Malcolm Fraser, 
took an unprecedented decision to call out the armed forces to protect the 
leaders for the remainder of CHOGM.  This was the first time since 1901 that 
the Commonwealth Government deployed military personnel to maintain order 
against a domestic threat during peacetime.30  
 
Although the Hilton bombing was the only attack on Australian soil that posed a 
sufficient threat to national security for the Government to take military action, 
it was not Australia’s only encounter with terrorism.  One year prior to the 
Hilton bombing, the Indian High Commissioner was wounded when he and his 
wife were kidnapped at gunpoint.31  In 1972, a Yugoslav Travel Agency was 
bombed in Sydney, injuring 16 people.32  In 1980, a group known as the Justice 
Commandos of the Armenian Genocide assassinated the Turkish Consul-
General and his bodyguard.33  There was a subsequent attack against Turkish 
interests in Australia in 1986, when the Turkish Consulate-General was 
bombed.34  Israeli-related interests have also been the subjects of violent attacks: 
in 1982, two bombs were detonated in the building of the Israeli Consulate-
General and the Jewish Hakoah Club.35  
 
Most of these acts of violence were aimed at institutions with an international 
context.  In the early 1980s, however, several acts of violence were directed 
                                                                                                             
be justified under Article 4 of the said convention, which permits them temporarily in times 
of public emergency.   
29  Hilary Charlesworth et al, ‘Deep Anxieties: Australia and the International Legal Order’ 
(2003) 25 Sydney Law Review 424.  In Al-Kateb v Godwin (2002) 208 ALR 124, McHugh J 
described the suggestion as ‘heretical’: 140.  
30  Tom Molomby, Spies, Bombs & the Path of Bliss (2000) 9. 
31 Jenny Hocking, Terror Laws: ASIO, Counter-Terrorism and the Threat to Democracy 
(2004) 131. 
32  Ibid 125. 
33  Significant Events in ASIO’s History Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
<http://www.asio.gov.au/About/Timeline/Content/main.htm> at 5 May 2005. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Ibid. 
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against an Australian institution: the Family Court.  These included the shooting 
of one judge in 1980 and the death of another judge’s wife in an explosion in 
1984.  Despite repeated targeting of the Family Court, there was consensus that 
the culprit was a disgruntled father seeking revenge over a decision that went 
against him, rather than a tactic in political conflict.36  For some writers, 
however, the nature of the violence was clear: ‘When an attack upon an 
individual or institution is understood to be the expression of a demand on the 
community, such violence is terrorism.’37  
 
The Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (‘ASIO’) has also noted 
incidents of politically motivated violence in Australia during the 1990s, all of 
which had terrorist overtones.38  For example, in 1992, the Iranian Embassy in 
Canberra was vandalised and its staff assaulted by Mujahideen e-Khalq 
supporters.  In 1995, following France’s decision to resume nuclear testing in 
the Pacific, protesters set the honorary French Consulate in Perth on fire.  In 
1999, protesters from the pro-Kurdistan Workers Party occupied the Greek 
Consulate-General in Sydney following the arrest of Kurdish leader Abdullah 
Ocalan.   
 
In the aftermath of the Hilton bombing, the former London Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner, Sir Robert Mark, was commissioned to advise the 
Commonwealth on policing resources and protective security.39  Amongst other 
things, Sir Robert recommended the creation of an anti-terrorist squad within 
the Australian Police Force as well as the amalgamation of the Commonwealth 
and Australian Capital Territory Police Forces.40  At the same time, Justice 
Hope was commissioned to review protective security powers and 
arrangements.41  He concluded that intelligence gathering and law enforcement 
authorities had adequate powers under existing legislation.42  Irregularities in 
the conviction for murder in 1990 of a man said to be the ‘mastermind’ behind 
the Hilton bombing led to his pardon two years later amid suspicions of the 
culpability of the New South Wales Police ‘Special Branch’ for the blast.43 
                                                 
36  Tracey Taylor, ‘Australian terrorism: Traditions of Violence and the Family Court 
Bombings’ (1992) 8 Australian Journal of Law and Society 15. 
37 Ibid 15-16. 
38  Significant Events in ASIO’s History, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
<http://www.asio.gov.au/About/Timeline/Content/main.htm> at 5 May 2005. 
39  Nathan Hancock, ‘Terrorism and the Law in Australia: Supporting Material’, Department 
of the Parliamentary Library, Information and Research Services, Research Paper No 13 
2001-02, 28. 
40  Ibid.  The latter recommendation was implemented by the Australian Federal Police Force 
Act 1979. 
41  Above n 39, 28-29. 
42  Ibid 29. 
43  The NSW Police Special Branch was responsible for criminal intelligence gathering.  It has 
been alleged that, in collusion with ASIO, it sought to stage a bombing to demonstrate that 
secret intelligence services served an imperative security need at a time when their powers 
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Concerns over their conduct in the matter generated fierce suspicion and 
antagonism towards intelligence agencies that still endures in some circles.44
 
That was over 20 years ago, before terrorism matured into its ‘modern’ phase.45  
Australia was unprepared for the slaughter on 12 October 2002 of 88 of its 
nationals by the Islamic Jihad bombing in the Sari Club in Kuta, Bali.46  One 
hundred Australians were murdered in terrorist acts during the first four years of 
the new millennium and at least one attack in Australia, or against Australian 
interests overseas, occurred or was disrupted or aborted, in each year.47  In 
2005, ASIO estimated that up to 80 people in Australia have trained or have 
close links with terrorist groups, but that only 10% of them could be charged 
with offences occurring after the entry into force of new counter-terror criminal 
laws.48  Five are currently facing charges.49
 
4 ASIO’S SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ROLE 
 
The Australian security intelligence community includes information collection 
and information analysis organisations.  ASIO, the Australian Secret 
Intelligence Service (‘ASIS’) and the Defence Signals Directorate (‘DSD’) 
                                                                                                             
were under serious political attack.  Three members of Ananda Marga, a religious 
revolutionary sect, were convicted in a related matter in 1979 but pardoned in 1985.  The 
three included Tim Anderson, the alleged ‘mastermind’ later pardoned again.  It is still 
unknown who was responsible for the blast.  See generally Molomby, above n 30; Head 
(MULR), above n 3, 670 and E Magner, ‘Is a Terrorist entitled to the Protection of the Law 
of Evidence?’ (1988) 11(3) Sydney Law Review 537, 567. 
44  Head, above n 3. 
45  The term ‘modern terrorism’ and its international dimension is discussed in Patrick Brogan, 
World Conflicts (3rd ed, 1998) 555. 
46  There was one Australian killed in the terrorist attack on the Sbarro Restaurant in Jerusalem 
on 9 August 2001, 10 in the World Trade Centre attacks on 11 September 2001, 88 in the 
Bali attacks on 12 October 2002, one in the Jakarta Marriott bombing on 5 August 2003 
and one in the London bombing on 7 July 2005.  On Australia’s unpreparedness for the 
Bali attacks and the response of law enforcement agencies, see Mick Keelty, ‘The new 
landscape of law enforcement’ (2003) 80 Platypus Magazine 14-15; Tom Allard, ‘Two 
nations caught tragically unprepared: Terrorism strikes home’, Sydney Morning Herald 
(Sydney), 14 October 2002, 6; Michael Carlton, ‘Unaware, unready for a foreign world’s 
rage’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 19 October 2002, 50. 
47  On the number of potential attacks on Australia that have been disrupted, see comments by 
Denis Richardson, Director-General’s Address, LAWASIA Conference 2005, Gold Coast, 
Wednesday 23 March 2005, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, 
<http://www.asio.gov.au/Media/Contents/lawasia_conference.htm> at 5 August 2005.  The 
Australian Federal Police Commissioner, Mick Keelty, has also recently backed the claim 
of a former ASIO agent that there are about 60 suspected Islamic extremists in Australia: 
‘Keelty backs agent: extremists are here’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 3 August 
2005.  On the number of Australians killed since 2000, see  above n 46. 
48  Patrick Walters and Greg Roberts, ‘Dozens’ of Aussies with terror links’, The Australian 
(Sydney), 24 March 2005. 
49  Ibid. 
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collect information.50  The Office of National Assessments (‘ONA’), Defence 
Intelligence Organisation (‘DIO’) and the Defence Imagery and Geospatial 
Organisation (‘DIGO’) analyse data collected by ASIO, ASIS and DSD.51  The 
Australian Crime Commission (‘ACC’) is unusual for its hybrid intelligence 
gathering and law enforcement characteristics but its purposes are more closely 
related to crime prevention than security protection.52 
 
Under the National Counter-Terrorism Policy (‘NCTP’), ASIO is made 
responsible for the gathering of intelligence about terrorist threats to Australia.53  
ASIO also advises the Government regarding security threats through threat 
assessments of specific events, facilities, sectors or individuals.54  ASIO’s 
purpose, powers and functions are outlined under the ASIO Act.55  Prior to 2003, 
ASIO already had powers to enter and search premises, conduct personal 
searches, access computers, attach listening and tracking devices and intercept 
telephones and mail.56  These powers continue and, in issuing search warrants, 
the Minister must be satisfied that 
                                                 
50  Noted in Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 128 2001-02, 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 
2002 Australian Parliamentary Website <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2001-
02/02bd128.htm> at 19 May 2004.  For a discussion on the history of Australian 
intelligence agencies, see Frank Cain, ‘Australian Intelligence Organisations and the Law: 
A Brief History’ (2004) 27 University of New South Wales Law Journal 296, 317.  Cain 
traces the development of Australian intelligence agencies from World War I and argues 
that through its expansion of powers to fight the ‘war on terror’, ASIO has effectively 
become a secret police force, which selectively provides the Government with intelligence 
that favours its political aims. 
51  Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 128 2001-02, Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002. 
52  Its main purpose is to ‘enhance Australian law enforcement’s capacity to counter serious 
and organised criminal activity’ through the provision of intelligence, collaborative 
partnerships and information sharing.  See Australian Crime Commission Website 
<http://www.crimecommission.gov.au/content/about/acc-profile.pdf> at 3 August 2005. 
53  National Cournter-Terrorism Committee, National Counter-Terrorism Plan (‘NCTP’) 
(2003) Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department 
 <http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/NationalSecurityHome.nsf/Page/RWPCD8501294925D
A06CA256D42001C1A4C?OpenDocument > at 30 November 2004.  More information on 
the NTCP appears under ‘Prevention’, 3:1. 
54  Ibid items 14 and 18. 
55  The Australian Secret Intelligence Service (‘ASIS’), though it existed under an executive 
order from 1952, was given a statutory framework under the Intelligence Services Act 2001.  
See Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 11 2001-2002, 
Intelligence Services Amendment Bill 2001, Australian Parliamentary Website,  
 <http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb//view_document.aspx?TABLE=BILLSDGS&ID=46
37 > at 30 November 2004. 
56  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 25(4), 25(4A)(a), 
25A(1), 26(1)(c), 26A(2) and 27; Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth) Pt III 
and Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 128 2001-02, 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 
2002. 
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‘there are reasonable grounds for believing that access by [ASIO] to records or 
other things on particular premises (the subject premises) will substantially assist 
the collection of intelligence in accordance with this Act in respect of a matter 
(the security matter) that is important in relation to security.’57  
 
However, because intelligence gathering from other than open sources is often 
achieved through covert operations, ASIO never had the power to interview 
suspected persons, which was left to the law enforcement agencies.58  
 
In 2003, ASIO’s powers were enhanced by the ASIO Terrorism Act, which 
added Division III to Part III of the original Act.  The definition of politically 
motivated violence in the ASIO Act was expanded to include terrorism 
offences.59  Further, ASIO was given the power to detain and question terrorist 
suspects, and non-suspects, who may have information on terrorist activities.60  
 
The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 
2002 (‘ASIO Terrorism Bill’) was first introduced into the House of 
Representatives on 21 March 2002.  It was controversial and the Bill's passage 
attracted enormous scrutiny during months of federal parliamentary 
wrangling.61  One commentator described the original Bill as ‘a law that would 
                                                 
57  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 25(2).  The tests for 
other warrants are couched in similar terms: computer access warrants (s 25A); listening 
devices warrants (s 26(3)); tracking device warrants (s 26B(2)); postal interception warrants 
(s 27(2)) and delivery service interception warrants (s 27AA(2)).  There are also special 
warrants to obtain foreign intelligence within Australia: see ss 17(1)(e), 27A and 27B. 
58  Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 128 2001-02, Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002. 
59  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth), s 4.  Similarly, the 
Telecommunications Interception Legislation Amendment Act 2002 (Cth) amended the 
Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Act 1979 (Cth) to include terrorist acts in 
the class of serious offences for which interception warrants may be issued.  The 
Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Act 2004 (Cth) broadens the definition of 
‘class 1 offence’ to include the terrorist offences listed in the Commonwealth Criminal 
Code Act 1995, ss 72, 101, 102 and 103: s 5(1)(cb).  It also permits the recording of 
communications to ASIO public lines without the need for a warrant: see s 6(3) and 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 111 2003-04, 
Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Bill 2004, Australian Parliamentary 
Website <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2003-04/04bd111.htm> at 12 February 
2005.  The Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment (Stored Communications) Act 
2004 excludes ‘stored communications’, such as filed email, from the scope of the 
Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Act 1979 (Cth) for a period of 12 months 
pending inquiries into the feasibility of a new regulatory regime for such communications: 
see Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 37, 2004-05, 
Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment (Stored Communications) Act 2004 
Australian Parliamentary Website <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2004-
05/05bd037.htm> at 12 February 2005. 
60  See below, ‘Warrants to detain’, 11. 
61  For example, see Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, above n 7, and 
Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee, above n 7.  There were 434 submissions 
reported in the Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee inquiry into the Australian 
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not be out of place in the dictatorships such as General Pinochet’s Chile.’62  It 
was passed one year later than other components of the 2002 counter-terrorism 
legal reform package.  Much of the controversy stemmed from the original 
Bill’s provisions relating to powers to detain and search children above the age 
of 10 and restricting persons questioned or detained from contacting family 
members or lawyers.63  
 
The Bill was finally passed by both Houses with amendments, receiving the 
Royal Assent on 22 July 2003.64  Since the passage of the ASIO Terrorism Act, 
the ASIO Act has been amended several more times to bolster federal 
governmental counter-terrorism powers.65  The most significant expansion of 
powers among these amendments was the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Legislation Amendment Act 2004 (‘ASIO Amendment Act 2004’).  
It allows ASIO to undertake security assessments in relation to prescribed 
administrative actions.  These include actions relating to whether a person 
should have access: to national security information; to places where access is 
controlled on national security grounds; or regarding a person’s ability to 
perform an activity related to a thing.66  The motivating purpose of these 
amendments was to enhance ASIO’s ability to carry out security assessments in 
                                                                                                             
Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/2002-
04/asio_2/report/contents.htm> at 8 November 2005 and 167 submissions reported in the 
Advisory Report on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 
 <http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/pjcaad/terrorbill2002/terrorindex.htm> at 8 
November 2005).   
62  Williams, above n 3, 215. 
63  Ibid.  See also Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 128 2001-02, 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 
2002. 
64  Apart from the debate on whether the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 was necessary, the controversy surrounded the provisions 
relating to the detention and search of children above 10 years of age and detention 
incommunicado without access to legal representation: see Head (ALJ), above n 3, 121-
126.  The original provisions allow for access to legal advice provided certain criteria are 
met and invalidate warrants for children below 16 years of age: see below, ‘Warrants to 
Detain’, 11. 
65  The significant amendments are set out in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
Legislation Amendment Act 2003, Anti-Terrorism Act (No 3) 2004 and Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment Act 2004.  Other minor amendments to 
the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) were made by 
Communication Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2004 (which gives the Australian 
Communications Authority the power to refuse a carrier licence on national security 
grounds) and Australian Passports (Transnationals and Consequentials) Act 2005 (Cth) 
(which makes consequential amendments to the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 (Cth), replacing references to the old Passports Act 1938 with 
references to the new Australian Passports Act 2005). 
66  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 35(a), 39(2). 
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relation to the importation, use and storage of ammonium nitrate.67  On 24 June 
2004, the Council of Australian Government (‘COAG’) agreed that the States 
and Territories should introduce a licensing system for ammonium nitrate 
products with more than 45% nitrate content.68  This slightly broadened base for 
gathering security intelligence on a recently perceived security threat - the 
mishandling of ammonium nitrate - is clear and straightforward and it aroused 
none of the controversy that surrounded ASIO’s new powers to detain for 
questioning as set out in the ASIO Terrorism Act.69  In the following pages, 
those detention powers, secrecy provisions concerning detentions and avenues 
for administrative and judicial review of detentions are examined and are 
analysed for their necessity and clarity. 
 
4.1 Warrants to Detain 
 
The ASIO Terrorism Act introduced powers to detain and question.  A person 
may be detained for questioning for up to 168 hours (seven days) continuously70 
by a prescribed authority (ie an independent legal expert, described below) upon 
issue of a warrant by an issuing authority (ie a judicial officer, described below).  
Special rules apply for minors between the ages of 16 and 1871 and warrants are 
ineffective for children under 16 years of age.72  The Director-General of ASIO 
must first seek the Attorney-General’s consent to request the issue of a 
warrant.73  The Attorney-General may consent if he or she is satisfied, amongst 
other things, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that issuing the 
warrant will substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is important in 
relation to a terrorism offence.74  An issuing authority may then issue a warrant 
to question a person if the Director-General of ASIO has requested such a 
                                                 
67  Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 45 2004-05, Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill 2004, Australian Parliamentary 
Website <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2004-05/05bd045.htm> at 12 February 
2005. 
68  Principles for the Regulation of Ammonium Nitrate (2004) Council of Australian 
Governments <http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/250604/attachments_d.pdf> at 11 
February 2005. 
69  For more information on this amendment, see Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, Bills Digest No 45 2004-05, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
Amendment Bill 2004, Australian Parliamentary Website 
 <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2004-05/05bd045.htm> at 10 August 2005. 
70  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34HC. 
71  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34NA(4)-(7). 
72  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34NA(1). 
73  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34C(1) and 34D. 
74  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34C(3).  The other 
things considered are whether relying on other intelligence collecting methods would be 
ineffective, that the procedures in sub-s (3A) have been followed and that if the warrant 
requires the immediate detention of the person, there are reasonable grounds for believing 
that the person may alert another person about the investigation, fail to appear before the 
prescribed authority or otherwise destroy any evidence. 
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warrant in accordance with the Act75 and the issuing authority is satisfied that 
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant will substantially 
assist the collection of intelligence that is important in relation to a terrorism 
offence.76  Importantly, the detainee need not be a suspect to be the subject of a 
warrant.77  Where a person fails to appear before a prescribing authority or fails 
to produce any document, object or thing as required once a warrant has been 
issued, the person may be prosecuted78 and the onus of proof falls upon 
defendants to prove their innocence.79 
 
These powers to detain and question are extraordinarily wide, particularly as 
they apply to minors over 16 years old.80  There were no such detention and 
questioning powers prior to enactment of the ASIO Terrorism Act.  Although the 
Crimes Act 1914 was amended in 2002 to include provisions concerning 
investigation of arrested terror suspects, including investigative detention 
periods, its provisions do not concern information collection from non-
suspects.81  The quality of information sought for security intelligence is 
different from criminal evidence, as indicated by the constraint against any 
information concerning an accused criminal suspect gathered through the use of 
an ASIO questioning warrant being used as evidence in court against that 
suspect.82  Thus, detention for information gathering entails different purposes, 
different qualities of information and different procedures.   
                                                 
75  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34C(4). 
76  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34D(1). 
77  The wording of ss 34(3)(c) and 34D(1)(b) only require the Director-General to be satisfied 
that the person will assist in the collection of intelligence. 
78  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34G(3) and (6). 
79  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34G(4) and (7). 
80  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34NA.  Concern over 
recruitment of minors into terrorist activities in Australia has centred on support for ‘the 
jihad stream’ in the Sydney-based Islamic Youth Movement, see: General Information 
About Nida`ul Islam Magazine Nida’ul – The Call of Islam 
 <http://www.islam.org.au/general/aboutus.htm> at March 2004. 
81  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 23CB, 23DA.  The Anti-Terrorism Act 2004 (Cth) amended the 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) to increase from eight to 20 hours the maximum fixed investigation 
period for terrorism offences and to reasonably suspend or delay investigations to enable 
authorities to make inquiries in overseas locations in different time zones.  Procedural 
safeguards such as the right to remain silent, contact a legal practitioner and the tape 
recording of admissions as a precondition to admissibility still apply: ss 23G, 23N and 23S. 
82  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34G(9).  Nevertheless, it 
might be possible that a court would accept police evidence obtained subsequent to security 
intelligence questioning as an indirect result of the information obtained from that process.  
See A Palmer, ‘Investigating and Prosecuting Terrorism: The Counter-Terrorism 
Legislation and the Law of Evidence’ (2004) 27(2) University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 373, 386-7.  Palmer argues that s 34G(9) of the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) offers ‘use immunity’ rather than ‘derivative use immunity.’ 
The latter would allow the use of derivative evidence that is obtained as an indirect result of 
the interrogation process.  Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 
128 2001-02, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 notes that a derivative use immunity was in place for investigations 
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Warrant issuing authorities are magistrates and superior court judges appointed 
by the Attorney-General (although they can refuse the appointment).83  It has 
been argued that vesting judges with the role of issuing authorities is 
incompatible with their judicial functions, which are separated from executive 
functions under the federal Constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.84  In 
relation to issuing authorities, it was held in Grollo v Palmer that the executive 
role of judges as issuers of interception warrants under the Telecommunications 
(Interception) Act 1959 (Cth) was compatible with the exercise of their judicial 
functions.85  The majority considered that interception warrants should only be 
issued by authorities such as judges because the authorization of intrusions into 
privacy requires impartial evaluation.86  A similar argument applies in the case 
of ASIO questioning warrants.  The pertinent issue is whether a judge’s role as 
either an issuing or prescribed authority would prejudice the capacity of the 
individual judge, or of the judiciary as an institution, to discharge effectively the 
responsibilities of exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth.87  Yet, 
the reasoning in the Grollo decision was narrowly divided and the majority of 
the High Court seems since to have shifted towards a more restrictive position 
on the constitutionality of judicial exercise of Executive powers.88  Thus, it is 
nevertheless arguable, in principle, that the role of federal judges as issuing 
authorities is unconstitutional and renders the issuing procedure uncertain and 
unworkable.  However, the precedent of Grollo, which is precisely on point, is 
likely to be determinative. 
 
Prescribed authorities, who may detain and question a person who is the subject 
of a warrant,89 are to include, in order of preference: retired federal superior 
court judges who have served for at least five years,90 current State and Territory 
                                                                                                             
under the National Crime Authority Act 1984 but that this was removed by the National 
Crime Authority Legislation Amendment Act 2001 because ‘the public interest in the 
Authority having full and effective investigatory powers, and … the use against the person 
of incriminating material derived from the evidence given to the Authority, outweigh the 
merits of affording full protection to self-incriminatory material’ (citing the National Crime 
Authority Legislation Amendment Bill 2001, Explanatory Memorandum, 8).  It can be 
analogously argued that the serious nature of terrorism would also outweigh fully 
protecting self-incriminatory material. 
83  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34AB(1), 34AB(2).   
84  The doctrine that federal courts may not exercise non-judicial powers was set out in R v 
Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 271-2 (Dixon CJ, 
McTiernan, Fullager and Kitto JJ). 
85  (1995) 184 CLR 348 (Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ; McHugh J dissenting). 
86  Ibid 367. 
87  Ibid 365. 
88  In Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1, 
the High Court considered whether the particular administrative task (in this case 
production of an investigative report) was ‘compatible’ with the judicial role otherwise 
performed by judges.   
89  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34F(1)(a). 
90  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34B(1). 
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superior court judges who have served for five years or, failing that, the 
President or a Deputy President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal who has 
been enrolled as a High Court or Supreme Court legal practitioner for at least 
five years.91  The appointee must consent.92  To exercise this power, the 
prescribed authority must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that, if the person is not detained, he or she may undermine the 
investigation.93  This condition imposes a safety check, additional to the 
exercise of judgment by the issuing authority.  The requirement of approval by 
both an issuing authority and a prescribed authority appears sufficient to ensure 
that detentions are premised on sound reasons. 
 
The constitutional separation of federal executive and judicial powers underlies 
the specification of persons who are not federal judges as prescribed authorities.  
Nevertheless, the appointment of State Supreme Court judges could still be 
problematic, given that such judges may exercise federal judicial powers.94  In 
the Kable Case, the High Court held that New South Wales legislation to permit 
the NSW Supreme Court to detain a named person was invalid because it 
conferred non-judicial powers on the NSW State Supreme Court.95  The powers 
of State Supreme Courts were considered to be part of an integrated judicial 
system for the exercise of both State and federal judicial power96 within the 
context of Chapter III of the Constitution.97  As the Constitution institutes a 
separation between Commonwealth judicial and executive powers, and does not 
distinguish between the status of State Courts vested with federal jurisdiction 
and the High Court of Australia, it followed that no executive function could be 
vested in State Supreme Courts that would ‘be of a nature that might lead an 
ordinary reasonable member of the public to conclude that the court was not 
independent of the executive government of the State.’98  Consequently, 
executive functions vested in State judges are potentially vulnerable to the same 
tests for compatibility as if vested in federal judges.  However, because 
prescribed authorities need not be judges and Grollo is analogously applicable 
to those that are, the provision governing prescribed authorities is certainly 
workable.   
 
                                                 
91  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34B(2), (3). 
92  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34B(4). 
93  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34F(3). 
94  Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51. 
95  Ibid. 
96  Ibid 102-103 (Gaudron J); 114 (McHugh J). 
97  In particular, section 71(iii) of the Constitution provides that the Commonwealth 
Parliament may vest State Courts with federal jurisdiction.   
98  Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 116 (McHugh J). 
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4.2 Detention Safeguards 
 
Beyond the prudent exercise of judgment by issuing and prescribed authorities, 
a series of safeguards against abuse of power are built into the detention and 
questioning procedure.  These concern the provision of independent legal 
advice, translation services, minimum standards of treatment, complaints 
procedures, recording of questioning and reporting on each detention, as set out 
below.  The Attorney-General’s Department has also produced a Protocol to 
guide the section 34D warrant process.99  The Protocol specifies details 
regarding the proscribed use of force, minimum facilities and accommodation 
and proper manner of questioning and conditions.100 
 
A person who is the subject of a warrant may contact a lawyer of his or her 
choice.101  However, that right is limited, notably where the prescribed authority 
is satisfied, on the basis of circumstances relating to that lawyer, that certain 
communications may be made or destroyed as a consequence.102  Similarly, a 
person may be questioned in the absence of the lawyer of his or her choice.  
However, it is unclear what circumstances a prescribed authority may take into 
account in determining whether questioning should proceed without a lawyer.  
The Section 34D Protocol is silent on this issue.103  Further, client-lawyer 
contact must be made in such a way as to be monitored by a person exercising 
authority under the warrant, although the prescribed authority must provide the 
lawyer reasonable opportunity during breaks in questioning to advise the 
detainee.104  The lawyer may be removed for unduly disrupting questioning but 
                                                 
99  The Section 34D Warrant Protocol was tabled before Parliament on 12 August 2003: 
Attorney-General, Daryl Williams AM QC MP, ‘ASIO Protocol to Guide Warrant Process’ 
(Press Release, 12 August 2003) available from Attorney-General’s Website 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/attorneygeneralhome.nsf/Page/Media_Releases_2003_A
ugust_2003_ASIO_Protocol_to_guide_warrant_process_(12_August_2003)> at 5 August 
2005.  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34C(3A)(a)(i) 
requires the Inspector-General of Intelligence to be consulted in developing a written 
statement of procedures to be followed in the exercise of ASIO’s detention powers under s 
34D of the same Act.  The Protocol is printed in the 2003-04 IGIS Annual Report, Annex 
2:  Annex 2 – Section 34D Warrant Protocol Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security 
<http://www.igis.gov.au/annuals/03-04/annex2.cfm> at 2 August 2005. 
100  S34D Warrant Protocol, above n 99. 
101  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34C(3B), 
34D(2)(b)(ii), (4). 
102  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34TA(2).  Presumably, 
‘circumstances’ concern whether the lawyer is known to be related or partisan.  However, 
‘circumstances’ might intend to refer to a lawyer’s security clearance: see Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, above n 7, recommendation 6. 
103  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34TB(1).  A note to s 
34TB specifies that a prescribed authority must be present during questioning even if a 
lawyer is not: see Section 34D Warrant Protocol, above n 99.  This issue should be clarified 
in the present review of Part III Division III or in the Protocol. 
104 Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34U(2), (3). 
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the detainee has the right to contact another lawyer if this occurs.105  
Additionally, the lawyer is entitled to a copy of the warrant but not necessarily 
any other document.106  It should be noted that the common law right to legal 
representation107 applies to criminal procedures but not to intelligence 
operations such as ASIO detention warrants.  The latter is an administrative 
proceeding, in relation to which representation is a legal requirement only in 
limited circumstances.108  
 
A prescribed authority must defer questioning if an interpreter is requested and 
required by the detainee.109  The interpreter must be provided unless the 
prescribed authority believes that the detainee has ‘adequate knowledge’ of 
English or can communicate with ‘reasonable fluency.’110  The ASIO 
Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (‘ASIO Amendment Act 2003’) extended the 
total questioning period to 48 hours if an interpreter is present at any time 
during a person’s interrogation.111  The rationale for the automatically extended 
questioning period might be that at least double the time is required when 
translation is used and that 48 hours provides a cap on the time extension.  
Nevertheless, the necessity of automatically doubling time is questionable.112  
The Crimes Act also provides for the use of interpreters during the questioning 
of a suspect by police but not for the automatic doubling of interrogation 
                                                 
105  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34U(5), (6).  It appears 
that a lawyer can only interject to say that something is not clear, as acknowledged by the 
Law Council of Australia: see Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, Parliament of 
Australia, Review of ASIO’s Questioning and Detention Powers: Discussion (2005), 
available from the Australian Parliamentary Website  
 <http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb//view_document.aspx?TABLE=COMMJNT&ID=69
499> at 2 August 2005.  Again, the Protocol does not address this issue: see Section 34D 
Warrant Protocol, above n 99.  By implication, any lawyerly question that falls outside this 
narrow category can be seen as undue interruption.  Whether lawyers can challenge the 
prescribed authority regarding the ‘continuation of questioning’ is the subject of on-going 
discussion between ASIO, the Inspector-General of Intelligence Services and the Attorney-
General’s Department: 2003-2004 IGIS Annual Report, above n 99, 129-130. 
106  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34U(2A). 
107  Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292. 
108  Krstic v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1988) 20 FCR 486.   
109  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34HAA(3), (4), 
34H(3), (4). 
110  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34HAA(2). 
111  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34HB(11).   
112  It has even been suggested that this may breach the ICCPR, Article 26 of which provides 
that all persons are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law 
without discrimination, although this interpretation seems to over-extend Article 26.  See 
Cynthia Banham, ‘ASIO grillings will breach civil rights, warns expert’, Sydney Morning 
Herald (Sydney), 27 November 2003 and corresponding comments in Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 68 2003-04, Australian Security and 
Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment Bill 2003, Australian Parliamentary 
Website <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2003-04/04bd068.htm> at 29 November 
2004.   
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time.113  Rather, various times are to be disregarded in calculating the 
investigation period.114  While obtaining an interpreter may be a time consuming 
process, the 48-hour investigation period could be unnecessary.  A potential 
solution could be to adopt an approach similar to that under the Crimes Act,115 
where, for example, any time taken to arrange for interpreters is added onto the 
end of the investigation period. 
 
It has also been asserted that the ASIO Terrorism Act may be unconstitutional 
because it enables the executive arm of the Federal Government to detain people 
without conviction for an offence, thus usurping a function of the judiciary.116  
The constitutional basis for detention powers differs for aliens and Australian 
citizens.  The High Court of Australia has determined that, when detained 
persons are aliens, the Executive’s power to detain is incidental to Parliament’s 
legislative powers over aliens117 and, when exercised with bona fides for the 
purposes of expulsion or deportation, is non-punitive in nature and does not 
involve an exercise of the judicial power.118  In relation to citizens, the 
constitutional legitimacy of using executive power to detain depends upon 
whether detention is reasonably necessary to fulfill a non-punitive purpose.119  
The categories of non-punitive purposes are not closed,120 although they are 
approached with a strong legal presumption that legislation does not intend to 
curtail fundamental freedoms such as personal liberty.121  To rebut the 
presumption, there must be ‘a clear expression of an unmistakable and an 
unambiguous intention to abrogate or curtail a fundamental freedom.’122  It 
seems likely that the courts would find the unambiguous intention to detain as 
articulated in the ASIO Terrorism Act is sufficient to rebut the presumption and 
                                                 
113  Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 68 2003-04, Australian 
Security and Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment Bill 2003. 
114  Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 68 2003-04, Australian 
Security and Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment Bill 2003.  See also Crimes 
Act 1914 (Cth) s 23CB. 
115  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23CB. 
116  Williams above n 3, 215.  This article was written before the 2003 amendments so many of 
the provisions which Williams discusses have been modified.  However, his argument that 
the amendments are constitutionally suspect because they breach the separation of powers 
doctrine would still be relevant to the ASIO Act in its present form. 
117  Section 51(xix) of the Constitution gives the Commonwealth the power to legislate with 
respect to aliens; see Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and 
Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, 30-32 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ).  The prerogative 
power also provides a basis for the Government to adopt measures concerning ingress of 
aliens: Ruddock v Vadarlis [2001] FCA 1329. 
118  Koon Wing Lau v Calwell (1949) 80 CLR 533, 556 (Latham CJ).   
119  Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 162 (Gummow J).   
120  Ibid. 
121  Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Al Masri (2003) 197 ALR 
241 (Black CJ, Sundberg and Weinberg JJ). 
122  Coco v R (1994) 179 CLR 427, 437 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
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that the safeguards against abuse indicate a non-punitive purpose.123  Thus, the 
argument that detention without conviction for questioning is inherently 
unconstitutional is tenuous at best.  It does not cause the detention powers to be 
uncertain or unclear.   
 
The ASIO Terrorism Act requires that a person detained or questioned must ‘be 
treated with humanity and with respect for human dignity, and must not be 
subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment by anyone exercising 
authority under the warrant or implementing or enforcing the direction.’124  A 
person’s appearance before a prescribed authority for questioning must be video 
recorded.125  The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security may be present 
during questioning or when the person is taken into custody.126  Failure to treat a 
detainee with humanity may result in up to two years imprisonment.127  Similar 
penalties apply when police officers fail to bring the suspect before a prescribed 
authority immediately after arrest,128 when an interview is conducted without an 
interpreter in circumstances where an interpreter is appropriate129 or when the 
provisions regarding strip searches are not followed.130  When a detainee first 
appears before the prescribed authority, and then once every 24 hours thereafter, 
he or she must be made aware of the right to seek a remedy in a judicial court 
relating to the warrant or to the detainee's treatment in connection with the 
warrant.131  The tough penalties for transgressors of these safeguards are likely 
to deter their breach. 
 
                                                 
123  Attorney-General, Daryl Williams AM PC MP, ‘The war against terrorism, national 
security and the Constitution: A response to Dr Renwick’ (Speech delivered at the annual 
dinner of the NSW Bar Association Constitutional Law Section, Sydney, 3 October 2002), 
available from Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Website at  
 <http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/Attorneygeneralhome.nsf/Page/RWP1ECEB58BC35FA5
67CA256B5F00755790?OpenDocument> at 14 February 2005. 
124  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34J(2).  The words 
‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’ in this provision reflect those used in the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment [1989] ATS 21 (entered into force 26 June 1987).  Jurisprudence established by 
the Committee Against Torture under this Convention could assist the interpretation of 
whether conduct amounts to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.  Further, the Section 
34D Protocol specifies that anyone who interacts with the person subject to a section 34D 
warrant must do so in a humane and courteous manner, and must not speak to that person in 
a demeaning manner.  It provides that a ‘subject must not be questioned in a manner that is 
unfair or oppressive in the circumstance’ and that a police officer must be present at all 
times during questioning: above n 99. 
125  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34K(1)(a). 
126  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34HAB. 
127  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34NB(4). 
128  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34NB(2). 
129  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34NB(4). 
130  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34NB(5), (6). 
131  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34E(1)(f), (3). 
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Where the procedures for requesting a warrant have been contravened, a person 
may complain to either the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security under 
the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 or to the 
Ombudsman under Part III of the Complaints (Australian Police) Act 1981.132  
Questioning must be deferred if the Inspector-General is concerned about any 
‘impropriety or illegality’ with regard to the questioning.133  At time of writing 
(June 2005), the Inspector-General or a staff member has been present whenever 
a person subject to a section 34D was questioned (other than for a short period 
during one day of questioning, for which video-tape and a written transcript 
were provided to the Inspector-General).  Nevertheless, the manifest weakness 
in this latter mechanism requiring deferral of questioning is that the Inspector-
General is not required to be present or to be directly available to receive a 
complaint.134  
 
The ASIO Terrorism Act also imposes a number of reporting requirements as 
additional safeguards.  For example, the Director-General of ASIO must provide 
written reports to the Minister on every terrorism warrant that is issued (under 
section 34D), describing the extent to which action taken under the warrant 
assisted ASIO to carry out its functions.135  In response to any concern of the 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security over impropriety or illegality, the 
Director-General of ASIO must provide copies of any warrant and video 
recording to the Inspector-General, as well as statements containing details of 
any seizures or describing any action that the Director-General has taken.136  
Where the Inspector-General receives a complaint from a person subject to a 
section 34D warrant, the Inspector-General has the discretion to conduct a 
formal inquiry into the complaint.137  In conducting such an inquiry, the 
Inspector-General has the power to access ASIO’s documents.138  The 
Inspector-General must present a report of the resulting conclusions and 
recommendations to ASIO and the relevant minister, although ASIO is not 
obliged to take action on those conclusions or recommendations.139  If the 
Inspector-General is of the opinion that ASIO has taken inadequate or 
inappropriate actions, the Inspector-General may prepare a report for the Prime 
Minister.140 
 
Of course, in common with all administrative measures to enhance the public 
accountability of the executive, these safeguards against abuse of powers are 
                                                 
132  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34NC. 
133  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34HA. 
134  2003-2004 IGIS Annual Report, above n  99, para 127. 
135  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth), s 34P. 
136  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34Q. 
137  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth) s 11. 
138  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth) ss 18, 20. 
139  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth) s 23, 24(1). 
140  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth) s 24(2). 
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administered by the executive itself and are vulnerable to manipulation.  The 
Inspector-General’s office has a small staff and one commentator has dismissed 
it as a mere ‘veneer’.141  It is too easy to junk administrative mechanisms for 
executive accountability, indeed the entire legal machinery for administrative 
review, without empirical study of the substantial public benefits that they 
provide.  In fact, the safeguards against ASIO abuse of its security intelligence 
gathering powers are extraordinary in their detailed ‘belt and braces’ self-




The ASIO Amendment Act 2003 inserted secrecy provisions into the ASIO Act, 
which principally address ASIO officers, detainees and their lawyers.142  A 
person commits an offence by disclosing ‘operational information’ or 
information related to a warrant.143  Operational information is defined as 
information that ASIO has or has had, a source of information, or an operational 
capability, method or plan belonging to ASIO.144  Information is warrant-related 
if it indicates that a warrant has been issued, the content of a warrant or the 
questioning or detention of a person in connection with a warrant.145  
Operational information is obtained as a direct or indirect result of the issue of 
the warrant or the doing of any act authorised under the warrant.146 
 
It is now an offence to reveal operational information within two years after the 
expiry of a warrant and, again, when the person disclosing it has obtained the 
information as a direct or indirect result of the issue of the warrant or the doing 
of any act authorised under the warrant.147  Both offences are strict liability 
offences,148 which means that the onus falls upon suspects to demonstrate their 
innocence.  There are exceptions for permitted disclosures, which include 
disclosures to a lawyer for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and to courts 
for the purpose of commencing proceedings.149  There is also a safeguard that 
                                                 
141  Michael Head, ‘ASIO, Secrecy and Lack of Accountability’ (2004) 11(4) E Law - Murdoch 
University Electronic Journal of Law, para 47  
 <http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v11n4/head114.txt> at 10 August 2005. 
142  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34VAA(3), which 
states that strict liability applies for the offences in ss 34VAA(1)(c) and 34VAA(2)(c) if the 
discloser is the subject of the warrant or the subject’s lawyer. 
143  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34VAA(5). 
144  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34VAA(5). 
145  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34VAA(1). 
146  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34VAA(5). 
147  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34VAA(2). 
148  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34VAA(3). 
149  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34VAA(5).  Others 
noted in s 34VAA(5) include disclosures to a parent or guardian or sibling of the subject; to 
a prescribed authority; the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; the Ombudsman; 
etc. 
 Terrorism and National Security Intelligence Laws 
provides that the criminal provisions do not apply to the extent that they inhibit 
any constitutionally implied freedom of political communication.150 
 
It is questionable whether these secrecy provisions were necessary, given that 
the Crimes Act 1914 already prohibits the disclosure of information by 
Commonwealth officers without lawful excuse if such information was obtained 
by virtue of their official positions.151  The Crimes Act also sets out offences for 
disclosing official secrets and penalties ranging from six months’ to seven 
years’ imprisonment.152  However, the effectiveness of the relevant Crimes Act 
provisions, sections 70 and 79, is doubtful.  The Independent Review 
Committee on Commonwealth Criminal Law, chaired by Sir Harry Gibbs, 
found that the secrecy provisions in the Crimes Act needed to be limited to 
certain categories of information, such as information relating to intelligence 
and security, defence and foreign relations, or confidential governmental 
information.153  Subsequent reviews of the espionage and security procedures 
have echoed this sentiment.154  They informed amendments to the espionage 
provisions in the Criminal Code Amendment (Espionage and Related Offences) 
Act 2002.  Yet, despite the extensive new espionage provisions in the Criminal 
Code, sections 70 and 79 in the Crimes Act remain.  In light of the redundancy 
of the Crimes Act provisions, the ASIO secrecy provisions appear necessary 
because they specifically and clearly deal with containing intelligence leaks. 
 
A further question concerns whether the secrecy provisions breach the freedom 
of political communication implied in the Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution.  The test for compatibility with this freedom was established in 
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, where it was held that legislation 
                                                 
150  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34VAA(12).  See text 
below n 155. 
151  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 70. 
152  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 79. 
153  The Committee, formed in 1987 by the Federal Government, reviewed Part VII of the 
Crimes Act, which includes the espionage and secrecy provisions, and presented its report 
in 1991.  The Committee sought to distinguish between disclosures that would harm the 
public interest and those that would not.  Only the former would attract criminal sanctions.  
See Attorney-General’s Department, Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law: Final 
Report (1991) 242, 315, 317 cited in Australian Law Reform Commission, Keeping 
Secrets: The Protection of Classified and Security Sensitive Information, Report No 98 
(2004) 5.66, 5.67, 5.83.  The Australian Law Reform Commission  ultimately 
recommended that ss 70 and 79 be amended to provide that a court might grant an 
injunction to restrain the disclosure of information where it is satisfied that a person is 
about to disclose classified information (recommendation 5.1).  It was also recommended 
that Parliament draw a distinction between conduct giving rise to criminal sanctions and 
conduct giving rise to administrative sanctions under the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) 
(recommendation 5.3) and that the relationship between ss 70 and 79 be clarified 
(recommendation 5.4).   
154  These reports were: Senate Committee on Public Interest Whistleblowing, Parliament of 
Australia, In the Public Interest (1994) and Commission of Inquiry into the Australian 
Secret Intelligence Service (1994). 
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impinges on the implied freedom if it thwarts free communication about 
government or political matters in ‘terms, operation or effect’ and the law is not 
‘reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end the fulfillment of 
which is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed 
system of representative and responsible government.’155  The ASIO secrecy 
provisions clearly operate to stifle the flow of communication about 
government.  Keeping the public aware of ASIO activity may be important 
information for the public concerning governmental political activity.  Although 
disclosures concerning operations and warrants are made illegal, there have 
been occasions where journalists have reported suspects being detained under 
ASIO’s anti-terrorism laws and it is unclear whether such disclosures were 
‘permitted disclosures’ under the secrecy provisions.156  Although the ASIO 
Terrorism Act contains a provision upholding the freedom of political 
communication, only a High Court challenge will confirm its scope.157  Thus, 
while the new ASIO provisions are generally necessary and clear, the precise 
scope of the secrecy provisions for the purposes of academic comment and 
journalism should be clarified. 
 
Secrecy provisions (both the ASIO and the Crimes Act secrecy provisions) raise 
broader contentious issues concerning government accountability.  Due to the 
sensitive nature of its operations, Australia’s domestic intelligence gathering 
agency operates behind a cloak of secrecy.  This might lead to the conclusion 
that ASIO’s functions are inherently incompatible with notions of accountability 
and the rule of law in any democratic society.158  Indeed, modern Western 
liberal democracies are built around notions of accountability.  Should their 
intelligence services’ activities never be open to democratic scrutiny? It is 
certainly arguable that, given the need for secrecy on the one hand and the need 
for public accountability on the other, Parliament attempted to strike a balance 
in the ASIO Terrorism Act.  It set in place a system of administrative review 
through the Inspector-General.  In addition, it set in place a cycle of 
parliamentary review and Executive actions are subject to judicial review.   
 
                                                 
155  (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow 
and Kirby JJ). 
156  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34VAA(5).  See 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 68 2003-04, Australian 
Security and Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment Bill 2003, which cites an 
article in the Weekend Australian, which describes an ASIO arrest as an example (‘ASIO 
flexes fresh muscle’, The Weekend Australian (Sydney) 8 November 2003). 
157  See generally Melissa Castan and Sarah Joseph, Federal Constitutional Law: a 
Contemporary View (2001) for cases and commentary on the implied freedom of political 
communication. 
158  Joo-Cheong Tham, ‘ASIO and the Rule of Law’ (2002) 27(5) Alternative Law Journal 216. 
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4.4 Parliamentary and Judicial Review 
 
The formulation and implementation of the ASIO Terrorism Act is subject to 
close parliamentary review, as evidenced by its passage through Parliament.  
The Bill was introduced to Parliament on 21 March 2002 and then referred to 
the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, and to the Senate 
Legal and Constitutional Legislation References Committee.  The Joint 
Committee released its report in May 2002.159  The Bill then passed the House 
of Representatives with amendments on 24 September 2002 and was 
reintroduced into the Senate on 15 October.  It was referred to the Senate 
Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills on 16 October and then again to 
the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee on 21 October 
2002.160  The latter issued its report on 3 December,161 but the Bill was laid 
aside on 13 December 2002 after the two Houses of Parliament could not agree 
on proposed amendments.  It passed both Houses with amendments and 
received the Royal Assent on 22 July 2003.  Subsequently, it has been amended 
five times.162  A sunset clause provides that the ASIO Terrorism Act provisions 
are to expire three years from the date of commencement.163  At the time of 
writing, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD has 
commenced its review of ASIO’s detention powers, pursuant to a provision 
inserted into the Intelligence Services Act 2001 by the ASIO Amendment Act 
2003.164  Whether the ASIO provisions and safeguards have struck the 
appropriate balance, and whether the provisions are still necessary beyond 2006, 
is something that the Joint Committee will consider in light of their initial period 
                                                 
159  See Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, above n 7; G Lanyi, 
‘Bringing Spies to Account: the Advisory Report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
ASIO, ASIS and DSD on the ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002’ (2002) 
10 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 68; and Consideration of Legislation Referred 
to the Committee: Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 [No 2]; 
Suppressing of the Financing of Terrorism Bill 2002; Criminal Code Amendment 
(Suppression of Terrorist Bombings) Bill 2002; Border Security Legislation Amendment 
Bill 2002; Telecommunications Interception Legislation Amendment Bill 2002. 
160  Jessica Wyndham, Commonwealth Anti-Terrorism Legislation, Briefing Paper prepared for 
the Human Rights Council of Australia, March 2003, 4-6, available from the Human Rights 
Council of Australia Website <http://www.hrca.org.au/issues.htm#War> at 19 May 2004. 
161  Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, above n 7. 
162  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) note 1 of the Notes to the 
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) on Australasian Legal 
Institute (AUSTLII) Website 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/asioa1979472/notes.html> 
at 11 November 2005. 
163  Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34Y.  Division III of 
Part 3 ceases to be in force on 23 July 2006. 
164  Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) s 29(1)(bb).  See The Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on ASIO, ASIS, and DSD’s Review of ASIO’s Questions and Detention Powers (2004) 
Parliament of Australia 
 <www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/pjcaad/asio_ques_detention/background.pdf> at 1 
March 2004. 
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of operation.  Far from subverting the democratic process, it seems that the 
ASIO Act is properly exercising Australia’s democracy. 
 
Whether the courts can effectively review ASIO activities is uncertain.  It can be 
argued that ASIO’s actions are, in principle, subject to judicial review.  In 
Church of Scientology v Woodward, ASIO’s powers to investigate potential 
security threats were questioned by the Australian High Court, which was 
divided on the matter.165  Murphy J held that any powers granted to ASIO must 
be exercised bona fides, ‘for the purposes for which they are conferred and with 
due regard to those affected.’166  Similarly, Mason J stated that ASIO is not 
authorised to exceed its statutory functions in relation to security and that a 
court can determine whether intelligence obtained by ASIO is relevant to 
security.167  Although Brennan J agreed with the High Court’s position that 
relief can be obtained if it can be shown that ASIO had acted ultra vires, he 
stated that the plaintiff must overcome evidentiary difficulties in proving that a 
particular matter is or is not relevant to security..168 In that connection, Gibbs CJ 
held that ‘it is impossible for a court to say that any intelligence collected in 
good faith … is not relevant to security, since it may, in the light of other 
material, bear on the question whether a person is or is not a security risk’.169  
 
Thus, ASIO as an agency is subject to judicial review, in principle.170  However, 
in practical terms, supporting evidence is difficult to adduce or assess.  The 
judgment of Gibbs CJ indicates that the High Court might be reluctant to 
second-guess the particular decisions that ASIO considers necessary to protect 
national security.  Judicial reluctance seems to be informed by the realization 
that, in fact, the judiciary is not well equipped to evaluate the competing 
interests that determine issues of national security.171  That reluctance might be 
                                                 
165  Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25.  ASIO had collected 
information on the Church and its members and classed them as a security threat.  The 
Church argued that it was unlawful for ASIO to do so.   
166  Ibid 68 (Murphy J). 
167  Ibid 61-62 (Mason J).  Generally, intelligence is relevant to security when it establishes 
whether a person is or is not a security threat: at 60.   
168  Ibid 72 (Brennan J). 
169  Ibid 52 (Gibbs CJ). 
170  Note that the ‘constitutional writs’ for judicial review of Executive action form part of the 
High Court’s original jurisdiction as set out in the Constitution and cannot be ousted.  
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1990 s 75; see Plaintiff S157/2002 v 
Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476. 
171  It has been suggested that substantive matters of national security themselves are inherently 
non-justiciable: Williams above n 3, 215 citing Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 
1, 162.  See also A v Hayden (No 2) (the ASIS case) (1984) 156 CLR 532.  In that case, 
several ASIS agents sought an injunction to restrain the Commonwealth from disclosing 
their identities to the Victorian Police Commissioner on the grounds that such disclosure 
would prejudice national security.  The Victorian Police sought to investigate the ASIS 
agents for possible criminal prosecution arising out the agents’ misconduct during training 
exercises.  The Commonwealth denied that national security would be prejudiced should 
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confirmed in the current global security environment, where national security 
officers must synthesize and analyse complex data trails to draw conclusions 
concerning the intentions and resources of particular persons.  For example, in a 
decision concerning deportation of a person on grounds of terrorism 
involvement, a majority of the British House of Lords considered that it could 
evaluate national security information, but declined to do so.172  On the other 
hand, in a more recent decision, a British specialist judicial body, the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission, overturned a decision of the Home 
Secretary.173  The Home Secretary, who had assessed a detainee as a threat to 
national security, then appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the 
appeal as no error on the part of the Commission could be demonstrated.174  The 
case might indicate a more muscular British judicial approach to reviewing 
security intelligence activities, one that could encourage Australian judiciary to 
examine security intelligence as evidence. 
 
                                                                                                             
the identities of the agents be revealed so that Court did not have to decide whether national 
security interests precluded disclosure.  However, Mason J stated that security agencies 
must operate within the rule of law: at 550 and that in cases of misconduct, individual 
agents might be held criminally liable, although the Commonwealth would be immune 
from prosecution; at 550.  Dawson and Wilson JJ considered that in certain circumstances, 
Government opinion on the public interest immunity, particularly where matters of national 
security are at stake, will carry significant weighting because ‘the consequence of a 
decision of a court on a matter of national security which is contrary to the considered view 
of the government could be very serious indeed’: at 576.  For commentary on the ASIO and 
ASIS cases, see Head, above n 141. 
172  In Home Department v Rehman [2001] UKHL 47, the appellant, a Pakistani national, 
appealed against a decision of the British Secretary of State for the Home Department to 
deport him as this would be ‘conducive to the public good and in the interests of national 
security’ because of his association with Islamic terrorist groups.  The issue before the 
House of Lords was what could constitute a threat to national security and whether the 
Secretary’s decision was open for review.  Lord Slynn (with whom Lords Steyn and 
Huttom agreed) held that due weight must be given to the conclusions of the Secretary and 
to foreign policy, although the decision was open to review.  Lord Hoffman (with whom 
Lord Clyde agreed) held that the issue of what constitutes a threat to national security was 
not justiciable but Lord Steyn suggested that the security matters are justiciable and that the 
UK Human Rights Act 1998 had given the courts a greater role in determining matters of 
national security: para 30. 
173  Secretary of State for the Home Department v M [2004] EWCA Civ 324.  The Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission was specially created following criticism of British 
deportation procedures by the European Court of Human Rights in Chahal v United 
Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413.  See The Hon Justice Michael Kirby AC CMG, ‘National 
Security: Proportionality, Restraint and Common Sense’ (Speech delivered at the 
Australian Law Reform Commission, National Security Law Conference, Federal Court of 
Australia Conference Room, Sydney, 12 March 2005) available from the High Court of 
Australia website: <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/kirbyj_12mar05.html#18> at 
3 May 2005. 
174  The hearing in the Commission and the Court of Appeal were largely conducted in closed 
sessions and as such, there is not much publicly available in the way of reasoning: see 
Kirby, above n 173. 




Were the ASIO Act counter-terrorism amendments unnecessary, in the sense of 
being duplicative or overlapping substantially and inconsistently with existing 
national laws? ASIO already had the power to gather intelligence by means such 
as conducting searches and intercepting telephones prior to passage of the Act.  
However, it did not have the power to detain and compulsorily question 
individuals.  Thus, the new detention powers are not duplicative of existing 
provisions.  The actual use of the new powers is constrained by prerequisite 
approval of the Attorney-General and judicially or legally experienced ‘issuing 
authorities’ and questioning is to be undertaken before similarly qualified 
‘prescribed authorities’.  These constraints seek to provide some assurance that 
individual detentions will be warranted only when properly considered 
necessary.   
 
Are the amendments clear, in the sense of being specific, certain, readily 
understood and practicable? There is cause for concern on these grounds.  Some 
of the safeguards against abuse of the new powers lack clarity.  Most 
importantly, the safeguard concerning the presence of the Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security during detention procedures is not sufficiently 
practicable on the face of it.  Importantly, it lacks a specific mandatory 
requirement for the Inspector-General to be present during questioning.  
Concomitant with this is the failure to specify, in case of the absence of the 
Inspector-General, a process for prompt and immediately effective delivery of 
complaints to the Inspector-General.   
 
Another safeguard requiring clarification concerns attendance of a detainee's 
preferred legal adviser during questioning.  The legislation allows for 
circumstances in which a detainee's preferred lawyer may be excluded but these 
circumstances are not made explicit.  Finally, the scope of ASIO’s new secrecy 
provisions also needs clarification as they relate to journalism and academic 
comment concerning warrant-related and operational information.  (In general, 
the Commonwealth’s outdated secrecy provisions need revision and 
clarification, particularly those in the Crimes Act.)  
 
Despite the above shortcomings, adequately articulated safeguards include the 
required presence of independent 'prescribed authorities', the use of 
interpretation and humane treatment and mandatory audio-visual recording and 
the delivery of reports on each detention.  Overall, these safeguards against 
abuse are relatively extensive, detailed and clear. 
 
The strategy of terrorism is to generate public fear.  The Hilton bombing 
imbroglio has ensured that the Australian public mistrusts security intelligence 
 Terrorism and National Security Intelligence Laws 
agencies.175  Nor should it trust agencies with opportunities to abuse their 
power.  Nevertheless, alarmist accusations that the Australian Government’s 
proposed reforms create a police state are themselves exploitative of a culture of 
public fear.  There will always be debate as to whether security intelligence 
powers are proportionate to threats.  The use of a legalistic rights-based 
framework to critique those powers cannot adequately assess proportionality.  
That debate is, in essence, political rather than legal and cannot be determined 
solely by legal arguments, even where human rights discourse is employed.  The 
ASIO Terrorism Bill in its original form was subject to countless political 
critiques and to a robust process of democratic scrutiny that led to substantial 
amendments.  Extended parliamentary scrutiny and debate produced a precise 
and clearly structured legal framework including calibrated safeguards that seek 
to ensure that the new powers include civil liberties protections, are exercised 
fairly and are subject to regular parliamentary review.   
 
Ultimately, it is the role of Parliament to define the balance of interests on 
which security intelligence legislation is based, the role of the Executive to craft 
policies to implement that legislation, and the role of civil liberties communities 
to challenge them both.  All three have been hard at work during the process of 
reform of Australian national security intelligence laws.  It remains for the 
federal courts to review their work by ruling on the constitutionality of the 
Parliament’s laws and the legality of the Executive’s implementation of them.  
No doubt, the application of ASIO’s new powers will be judicially tested for 
ultra vires, based on lack of bona fides, or for unconstitutionality, based on 
incompatibility with the implied freedom of political communication.  In all 
likelihood, we shall not need to wait long for the judiciary to be called into play. 
                                                 
175   Greg Carne, ‘Terrorism and the Ambit Claim: Security Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth)’ (2003) 14 Public Law Review 18. 
